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The reconstruction of legal expectations when parties remain
silent is not only speculative but also question-begging and tauto-
logical. Perceptions offairness are substituted for the actual voli-
tion of the parties to be validated through other means. By
contras the parties'factual expectations do carry weight in de-
termining the reach of a state's power over them. Recent Supreme
Court decisions on jurisdictional due process, especially World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, employ a methodology which sat-
isfactorily distinguishes between expectations of law and fact.
But in the conflicts case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague the Court
dubiously reconstructed and relied on hypothetical expectations
which did not materialize and its import should be limited on its
facts and to the insurance field.
Starting with Shaffer v. Heitner,' and continuing with Kulko v.
Superior Court,2 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson3 and Rush
v. Savchuk,4 the United States Supreme Court began to recon-
sider the major premises of due process judicial jurisdiction, es-
pecially those of limited ad hoc jurisdiction (quasi in rem and in
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rem) and specific jurisdiction (long-arm). In Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague,5 the Court broke a fifteen-year string of rejections
of certiorari and finally addressed the due process and full faith
and credit dimensions of legislative jurisdiction and choice-of-law.
In all of these cases, and more particularly in World-Wide Volk-
swagen and Allstate, one of the fundamental considerations was
fairness to the party subjected to the jurisdiction or law of a par-
ticular state, and the "touchstone" or the lynchpin of fairness is
said to be the "reasonable expectation of the parties." 6 Party ex-
pectations may also have some significance in the allocatory func-
tion of due process and full faith and credit by preventing state
overreaching and infringement of the co-equal sovereignty of the
other states under federalism. 7 Before analyzing and evaluating
the use of party expectations by the Supreme Court as a factor of
due process, it will be helpful to revisit the meaning and role of
the concept of party expectations at the level of choice-of-law
proper in situations where there is no constitutional compulsion.
If there is one proposition that transcends the disputations be-
tween traditionalists and modernists in conflicts, it is that the jus-
tified or reasonable expectations of the parties do carry some
weight in the choice-of-law process. This is not to say that differ-
ences of opinion do not persist as to their relative importance.
Those who emphasize the private nature of the rights in conflict,
such as Professor M. Rheinstein, elevate the vindication of party
expectations to a primary, if not the principle consideration. 8
Others, especially the adherents of the governmental interests
school of conflicts, such as Professors B. Currie and R. Baxter,
play them down.9
It is with the party autonomy component of party expectations
that the consensus of conflicts authorities has been at its maxi-
mum. Within certain limits, the parties are allowed to fix the ap-
plicable law as part of their agreement. For example, under
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law (Sec-
ond Restatement), autonomy is total on matters of contract inter-
5. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
6. Id. at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7. 449 U.S. at 324 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8. Rheinstein, Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws, 18 OKLA. L REV.
238, 241 (1965); Rheinstein, Book Review: Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 32 U. CH.
L. REV. 369, 370, 374-75 (1965); Rheinstein, Book Review: How to Review a Fest-
schrift, 11 AM. J. CoMip. L. 632, 658-59 (1962); Rhenstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L REv. 4, 17-31 (1944). Cf. E. RABEL, 2
THE CONFLCT or LAws: A CompAn=rZv STUDY 304 (2d ed. 1960).
9. B. CuRRru, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CoNFucT OF LAWS, especially at 621,
730-33, 736-39 (1963); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 3, 22 (1963).
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pretation. However, on other issues such as formalities, capacity
and substantive validity, it is required that the parties' choice
have a "reasonable" basis (e.g., a substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction) and that the application of the chosen
law not be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state having a
materially greater interest and whose law would have been other-
wise applicable.o Section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) appears even more permissive, providing that the parties
can effectively choose the UCC to govern if it bears a mere "rea-
sonable relation" to the transaction.
Effectuating the will of the parties and reinforcing the security
of transactions are often cited as the principle reasons for uphold-
ing party autonomy." In the words of comment (e) to section 187
of the Second Restatement:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations
of the parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy
what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract... In this
way, certainty and predictability of result are most likely to be secured.
Giving parties this power of choice is also consistent with the fact that, in
contrast to other areas of the law, persons are free within broad limits to
determine their contractual obligations.
In the autonomy context, the expectations, whether express or
implied,'2 are actual and common to all the parties concerned.
The case for their recognition is simple and straightforward and
their content can be established under the proven methods of
contract interpretation. Whether the expectations are reasonable
is to be determined under criteria which may not be very precise
but are manageable under conflicts analysis.
In terms of its status, the rule that the parties may choose the
applicable law is just another conflicts rule and, indeed, of rela-
tively low rank since it must yield, for example, to the fundamen-
tal policies of the otherwise applicable law.' 3 Further, the rule is
10. On the limits of party autonomy, see, e.g., Blalock v. Perfect Subscription
Co., 458 F. Supp. 123, 127 (S.D. Ala. 1978), affid, 599 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1979); Busi-
ness Incentives Co. v. Sony of America, 397 F. Supp. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 65 FR.ID. 624, 630-31 (D. Nev. 1974); Freed-
man v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260, 401 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1977).
11. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721,
734-38 (1957).
12. For recent authorities on choice-of-law by implication, see, e.g., Zeevi v.
Grindlays Bank Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975). See generally, Kegel,
The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUI. DES COURS 95, 189-91 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Southern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfleld, 410 F. Supp. 1339
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
limited because, by its very nature, it operates only in the area of
consensual transactions (e.g., the rule does not operate in tort
law).
The trouble begins when the reasonable or justified expecta-
tions of the parties are sought to be used outside and beyond the
range of the rule of party autonomy. The Second Restatement
uses fairly representative language in support of this extended
use.
The Magna Carta of "Choice-of-Law Principles", enshrined in
section 6 of the Second Restatement, specifically includes "the
protection of justified expectations" among the seven basic fac-
tors. Comment (g) on section 6 gives us some clues as to its
meaning and rationale:
This is an important value in all fields of the law, including choice of law.
Generally speaking, it would be unfair and improper to hold a person lia-
ble under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded his
conduct to conform to the requirements of another state .... There are
occasions, particularly in the area of negligence, when the parties act
without giving though to the legal consequences of their conduct or to the
law that may be applied. In such situations, the parties have no justified
expectations to protect, and this factor can play no part in the decision of
a choice-of-law question.
14
Turning to comment (b) on section 188 of the Second Restate-
ment, we are told more specifically that protecting "the justified
expectations of the parties is a basic policy underlying the field of
contracts" and that "it may at least be said. . that they expected
that the provisions of the contract would be binding on them".15
In other words, in the absence of an express or implied choice of
law by the parties, we should lean toward validation of the
contract.' 6
When it comes to torts, the expectations of the parties are sub-
stantially downgraded in comment (b) to section 145(1) of the
Second Restatement:
Thus, the protection of the justified expectations of the parties, which is of
extreme importance in such fields as contracts, property, wills and trusts,
is of lesser importance in the field of torts. This is because persons who
14. Professor Reese, the Restatement Reporter, expresses a similar position in
Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1595, 1608 (1978). See also
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 329-30 (1972).
Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 188, comment b (1971).
16. This validation preference is not altogether beyond dispute. For example,
Currie has challenged the proposition that the probable intention of the parties to
be bound in contract should be determinative in choosing the applicable law and
in deciding which state's validation policy ought to prevail. The identical intention
to be bound presumably does exist also in a purely domestic situation but the is-
sue is really if, in reaching a decision on whether the contract is binding, such in-
tention ought to prevail over the invalidating policies reflected in other principles.
See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 103 (1963).
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cause injury on nonprivileged occasions, particularly when the injury is
unintentionally caused, usually act without giving thought to the law that
may be applied to determine the legal consequences of this conduct.
1 7
At first glance, these quotes appear quite sensible. But a closer
examination quickly dispels this favorable impression and raises
serious doubts about the meaning and utility of the very concept
of 'justified expectations" as a conflicts factor beyond party
autonomy.
We are told by the Second Restatement that if a person 'justifi-
ably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements' 8 of the
law of a particular state, it would be unfair and improper to hold
him liable under the law of another state. But how are we to as-
certain whether (a) in fact, that person so molded his conduct
and (b) this was justified? We are given no guidance on how to
verify the actual reliance upon a particular law in the absence of
an express or implied choice of law clause; and on what the
source of the justification might be. The fiction that parties do
form conscious expectations as to the identity of the normative
criteria by which their activities will be judged, that they in fact
rely on the requirement of a particular norm and that such reli-
ance is capable of identification has been seriously questioned.19
This fiction has been exposed most tellingly and persuasively by
Professor Shapira.20 Shapira concludes that reconstructing or hy-
pothesizing party expectations as to the applicable law obscures
legal reasoning2 ' and that their purported vindication is "nothing
but an empty slogan".22
17. See RESTATEMENT § 145, comment b, supra note 15.
18. See RESTATEMENT § 6, comment g, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Berkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961); Miller v.
Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968). See also D. CAvERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW
PROCESS 302 (1965); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 COR-
NELL L. REV. 185, 189 n.17 (1976); R. CRAoxN, D. CURRIE & IL KAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 359 (3d ed. 1981).
20. A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 81, 85 (1970).
21. Id. at 81.
22. Shapira, "Grasp All Lose All"-On Restraint and Moderation in the Refor-
mulation of Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 267 (1977). See also
Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, 75 N.W.U.L. REV.
363, 379, 380 (1980):
[J]urisdictional foreseeability is a conclusion that implies advance litigant
perception of relevant grounds for jurisdiction. The foreseeability concept
itself cannot provide these grounds.... Jurisdictional foreseeability, de-
rived from either forum activity or probable product presence, must be
preceded by judicial support for such jurisdiction, and that support obvi-
ates foreseeability.
The difficulty with party expectations becomes even more acute
when one focuses on the additional requirement that they be rea-
sonable or justified. Where are we to search for the justification?
Justification would be superfluous if it is to derive from the ex-
isting choice-of-law rules themselves, since the rules would apply
in any event regardless of the justified expectations. Relying on
the expectations themselves to -generate conflicts rules leads into
a tautology and circuity of argumentation-the expectations as to
what law is to apply would apply because of the expectations and
the expectations would be justified because of the applicable law.
Finally, if we turn to the parties' mutual perception of what the
conflicts rules ought to be, assuming arguendo that such percep-
tion can be proven which is extremely doubtful, we do nothing
more than beg the question of its legitimacy and open up the Pan-
dora's box of undefined natural justice.23 Professor Weintraub's
original reliance on the concept of "unfair surprise" to protect the
defendant in an otherwise pro-plaintiff system of tort choice-of-
law24 suffers from the same defects. We are not told how to estab-
lish the fact of such "surprise" and how to determine its
unfairness. 25
A closer examination of the expectations or surprise arguments
shows that what we are dealing with is not an independent ele-
ment but just another version of the theory of appropriate and
fair contacts. To take the simplest case, if the parties and the oc-
currence relate only to one state, we assume that the parties ac-
ted in reliance upon the law of such state or at least they
expected that such law would apply and we decide that such reli-
ance and expectation is justified under the applicable conflicts
and constitutional criteria. It is on this basis that we conclude
that the parties would be unfairly surprised if another law were to
apply. The greater the planning element in the particular context
23. On the problem of justification, see Martin, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 191 (1976)). See also J. MATm, CONFLICT
OF LAWs 368 (1978); Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 L &
CONTEAM. PROB. 106, 723 (1963). Cf. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854
(1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
24. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFICT OF LAWS 209 (1971); Weintraub,
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44
IowA L. REv. 449-62 (1959).
25. "Doesn't Weintraub's argument come to the right result for the wrong rea-
sons-the defendant perceives the result [applying plaintiff's home state law] as
unfair precisely because it is unfair, and not vice versa?" J. MARmTN, PERSPECTIVES
ON CONFLICT OF LAws: CHOICE OF LAw 152 (1980). It should be noted that Profes-
sor Weintraub's recent statements contain changes which alter significantly the
complexion of his approach: for "unfair surprise" he has substituted the objective
factors of "contacts with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended
course of conduct." R. WEiNTRAUTB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 346
(2d ed. 1980).
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(e.g. in consensual transactions or in intentional conduct) the
more pressing the need to give effect to those kind of expectations
and to prevent unfair surprise.
The question-begging nature of these theories leads us back to
the fundamental issue of what circumstances make it appropriate
and fair for a state to apply its law in a particular case. Our anal-
ysis has thus established that what we are looking for is not so
much the parties' speculative, subjective expectations but some
objective standard of rationality and fairness to justify the appli-
cation of a particular law in a multistate situation.2 6 In the consti-
tutional context, it is the function of due process to ensure that
the states do not extend the limits of their judicial power and the
applicability of their law beyond reason and fairness. For the rea-
sons already given, if the parties' legal expectations are dubious
in choice-of-law proper, they are doubly questionable in defining
the due process and full faith and credit parameters of state au-
tonomy in jurisdiction and choice-of-law.
To explore this point a bit further, let us assume that a state
has given fair notice as to the reach of its jurisdictional and legis-
lative powers27 and that it does not improperly extend the retro-
active exercise of such powers.28 The question, then, of whether
26. MARnN, supra note 20; SHAPmA, supra note 17, at 87 ("In lieu of a futile
endeavor to reason in terms of vindication of subjective expectations, one should
invoke an objective and functional test of rational connection as a fair criterion of
justice to private interests").
27. That the exercise of state jurisdictional powers should be based on specific
rules giving adequate notice of their purpose and reach is intimated both in Shafer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-16 (1977) and in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98
(1978). See also Sun First Nat. Bank of Orlando v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Cf. The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L REV. 152, 161 & n.59
(1977). On the other hand, the plurality opinion in Allstate v. Hague, 191 S. Ct. 633,
642-43 (1981) upheld the application of Minnesota law inter alia on the basis of
Minnesota's regulatory powers over companies doing insurance business within
the state even though the controversy had no connection whatsoever with such
business and Minnesota had not enacted statutory rules purporting to exercise
such powers. The dissent took issue with this approach. Id. at 653.
By way of contrast, we could refer to the no-fault insurance law of New York
which contains explicit provisions on its applicability to out-of-state policies but
only while the insured vehicle is being operated in New York. N.Y. INS. L. § 676
(McKinney supp. 1979).
28. See B. CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 737-38 (1963);
Neuner, Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. B. REV. 479, 482-84
(1942). Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
It might be observed that if there is one area where the justified expectations of
the parties should carry great weight in choice-of-law, it should be (a) to prevent
the retroactive change of conflicts rules by judicial reconsideration in pursuit of
such state's jurisdictional rule is consistent with due process can-
not be answered by reference to the subjective expectations of
the parties, if the parties had any. The parties should have known
and anticipated the application of these rules. Whether this is
justified cannot depend on the parties' actual or hypothetical ex-
pectations as to fairness except in the most philosophical sense,
that the law in a democratic society ought to be responsive to the
general popular will. It is the United States Constitution that em-
bodies the supreme law establishing due process and it is for the
United States Supreme Court to articulate the criteria defining
fairness under due process. Hence, whether particular parties be-
lieve in and approve of lex loci delicti is irrelevant to its scrutiny
under due process.
This becomes even clearer when we consider the place of
"party autonomy" in choice-of-law. It is here that the parties by
common agreement unambiguously select the law which they
wish and expect to apply. Yet, as a matter of conflicts law, such
expectations are given effect only if they are reasonable and not
contrary to the policy of the state with the most significant rela-
tionship to the parties.29 A fortiori, such expectations cannot de-
termine the scope of the power of a state to define the interstate
or international dimension of its legislative and judicial jurisdic-
tion. In fact, the Supreme Court has paid scant attention to con-
tractual clauses attempting to control the choice-of-law and has
instead routinely upheld the application of the law of another
state.30
Even though the expectations of the parties as to the applicable
rules of jurisdiction or choice-of-law should be disregarded in a
due process context, the same is not true of the parties' expecta-
tions as to facts or their predictions on whether a particular event
or transaction will in fact be connected with a particular state.
This is an important distinction which should be articulated and
kept in mind. The very notion of "purposeful availment" of the
protection and benefits of the laws of a state which is central to
due process analysis signals the relevance of the parties' reason-
able projections that their activities will or will not have an out-of-
state dimension.
The issue here is one of reasonable foreseeability of the requi-
site factual connections, not of legal perceptions about jurisdic-
the conflicts revolution and (b) to prohibit the taking into account of post-event
changes in circumstances such as plaintiff's change of domicile.
29. See note 10 supra.
30. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Califor-
nia, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493, 498 (1939).
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tion, conflicts or substantive legal rules. The mere connection of
an event with a state should not suffice to trigger jurisdiction or
the application of a particular law. The connection should be at-
tributable to a party under rules which require reasonable fore-
seeability as an indispensable, but not necessarily, sufficient
prerequisite.
31
To illustrate the difference between expectations of law and ex-
pectations of fact, let us suppose that all states follow a lex loci
delicti approach with the place of the harm as its centerpiece. If
a person's activities in State A create the reasonable probability
that harm will occur only in States A, B and C, then it would be
justifiedly unexpected and unfairly surprising to subject that per-
son to the law of State D where the harm actually happened to
occur. By the same token, if only some of the states follow the lex
loci delicti and other states, such as State D, use the governmen-
tal interests analysis and rely principally on the victim's domicile
in choosing the applicable law, then the defendant who creates a
foreseeable risk of harming a resident of State D could justifiably
be subjected to the law of that other state, whatever the locus of
the harm. The foreseeable content of a particular conflicts rule
31. As aptly put by Professor Shapira:
If the party can reasonably be charged with fair notice as to the potential
transnational ramifications of the affair at hand then one may conclude
that a rational connection does exist between that party and the foreign
legal standard.... [T]he party in question could have reasonably per-
ceived at the relevant time a possible contact with, or impact upon, per-
sons, property, institutions or events which might fall within the
prescriptive domain of a given legal system.
Shapira, "Grasp All Lose All"-On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation
of Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUm. L. REV. 248, 268 (1977).
The proper relation between expectations and contacts in a due process context
was clearly recognized in the recent case of McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
649 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1981), where it was stated that:
When parties' expectations are rationally based upon one state's laws, or
in the negative, when their rational expectations are not based upon the
laws of some other state, it violates due process to breach those expecta-
tions by applying the unexpected law. When the forum's contacts with
the parties or the transaction satisfy the Court's "significant contacts"
test, however, it follows, necessarily, that no party may 'reasonably" ex-
pect that the forum state's law cannot control the case. In such a situa-
tion, the forum state's power to apply its own law is unquestionable.
See also the recent version of Professor Weintraub's approach in T. WEmTRAUrB,
ComMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 326-28, 511-12 (2d ed. 1980); Weintraub, The
Future of Choice of Law for Torts-What Principles Should be Preferred?, 41 L. &
CONTEa. PROB. 146, 159-63 (1977); and Leflar, Choice Influencing--Considerations
in Choice of Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 299-300 (1966). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS OF LAW § 387, comment a (1934).
would have nothing to do with the protected expectations of the
parties. Such expectations would relate only to the factual ele-
ments of the case.
If the preceeding analysis is correct, then the real problem in
this field is to determine the qualitative and quantitative criteria
which make foreseeability of factual contacts a reasonable basis
for the assertion of the related state power. In situations where
jurisdiction or choice-of-law is based on the locus of conduct or on
personal affiliations with a particular state such as domicile and
residence, a party who knowingly or intentionally establishes or
creates the necessary connection could be charged with the juris-
dictional and conflicts consequences without frustrating any justi-
fled expectations. The same result should prevail even in
negligence situations where the conduct takes place within a par-
ticular state or states. The intention to engage in the conduct in
that locality and the creation of the risk there should suffice for
reasonable foreseeability. The fact that the negligence and the
harm were not intended or contemplated should be without sig-
nificance in that context.
The Second Restatement's reference in section 6, comment (g),
to a party "molding his conduct to conform to the requirements of
a state" 32 should be rephrased to negate the implication that such
conduct must be lawful under the law of such state. The decisive
element should be the expected factual connection of the conduct
with the state, not its expected legality. Similarly, the distinction
in the same comment (g) between intentional and negligent con-
duct should be dropped because what matters is the intentional
location of the conduct, not any perception about legal conse-
quences, jurisdiction or applicable law.
The area where reasonable foreseeability is most important and
also where the greatest difficulties are encountered involves juris-
diction or choice-of-law based upon "effects" within the state. As-
suming that substantial and direct effects (including single events
such as one transaction or one injury) alone or in combination
with other contacts constitute a sufficient contact for long-arm
jurisdiction over, or the application of a state's law, to the actor,
what is the quantum and quality of foreseeability required before
the fairness requirement is satisfied? The issue has arisen most
often in the context of long-arm jurisdiction. In conflicts law, it is
also becoming an increasingly prominent issue in the area of
product liability.
The current versions of long-arm statutes contain specific "ef-
32. See RESTATEMENT § 6, comment g, supra note 15.
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fects" sections where foreseeability of harm within the state, al-
beit not always sufficient, is necessary. In New York, Civil
Practice Rule 302(a) (3) (ii) provides that a person who commits a
tortious act outside the state causing instate injury is amenable to
suit in the state if he "expects or should reasonably expect the act
to have consequences in the state and derives substantial reve-
nue from interstate or international commerce." 33 Ohio provides
for long-arm jurisdiction over a person causing injury within the
state to any person:
By breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods
outside this state when he might reasonably have expected such person to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he
also regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered in this state.34
Section 37 of the Second Restatement deals with "effects" juris-
diction in the following language:
Causing Effects in State by Act Done Elsewhere. A state has power to ex-
ercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the
state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising
from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's
relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction
unreasonable.35
Identical language with respect to corporations is contained in
section 50 of the Second Restatement. Comment (a) to section 37
makes it abundantly clear that the actor's state of mind is the
most important element in determining reasonableness. If the ac-
tor intended causing effects within the state, the actor is treated
as if he was, in effect, acting within the state. At the other ex-
treme, where there was no foreseeability of effects within the
state, the "state is unlikely to have judicial jurisdiction... unless
[both parties] have an extensive relationship to the state."36 In
the intermediate situation where the defendant's act "could rea-
sonably have expected" to produce in-state effects, a variety of
factors are taken into consideration in evaluating jurisdiction.3 7
For choice-of-law, a good illustration is contained in Professor
33. N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAw § 302(a) (3) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
34. OHIO CIv. PRO. CODE Rule 4.3(A)(5) (1970).
35. See RESTATEMENT § 37, supra note 15.
36. See RESTATEMENT § 37, comment a, supra note 15.
37. For cases where § 37 was applied by the courts with an emphasis on fore-
seeability analysis, see, e.g., Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 71 Mich. App. 263, 247
N.W.2d 375 (1976) (the presence of the hairdryer in the state "could be expected"),
Anderson v. Luitjens, 247 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1976) (in the circumstances, it was
Cavers' most recently proposed principle of preference for produ-
cer's liability. Adoption of this principle would permit the claim-
ant to invoke the favorable law of either (a) the state of his
habitual residence and product acquisition or harm or (b) the
state of product acquisition and harm unless "the producer estab-
lished that he could not reasonably have foreseen the presence in
that state of his product which caused harm to the claimant or his
property."38 A comparable example is to be found in Article 7 of
the Hague Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Products'
Liability (1972) in the preparation of which the American delega-
tion had significant input.39 It reads as follows:
Neither the law of the state of the place of injury nor the law of the state
of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage shall be
applicable... if the person claimed to be liable establishes that he could
not reasonably have foreseen that the product or his own products of the
same type would be made available in that state through commercial
channels.40
With reference to international transactions, the foreseeability
of a direct and substantial effect is again recognized as a crucial
factor both in jurisdiction and in choice-of-law based on effects
(objective territorial principle). In section 18(b) (iii) of the Re-
statement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1965), it is recognized that a state has jurisdiction to legis-
late with respect to foreign conduct having substantial domestic
effects, inter alia, if the effects occur "as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory."
41
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Maxwell,42 Judge
Friendly relied, presumably by analogy, on the foreseeability lan-
guage of section 18 to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a
reasonable for defendant to foresee that serving liquor to a minor in Iowa might
lead to an accident in Minnesota).
It is interesting to note that the connections used to reinforce "effects" jurisdic-
tion are often not related to the claim and sometimes not even related to the state.
See, e.g., the New York reference to deriving "substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce." N.Y. Crv. PRAC. § 302(a) (3) (ii); REPORT TO THE 1966
LEGISLATURE IN RELATION TO C.P.L.R. CIv. PRAC. AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 229 OF THE JUDICIARY LAW, TwELFrI ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 337, 343-44 (1967).
See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy-
sis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1167-73 (1966).
38. Cavers, The Proper Law of Producer's Liability, 26 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 703,
728-29 (1977).
39. Id. at 721-22.
40. Documents, 21 Am. J. ComrP. L. 149, 151 (1973).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18(b) (iii) (1965). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(1)(c), 403(2) (a), 403 (2)(a)(d) (jurisdiction to
prescribe) and § 441(2) (j) (jurisdiction to adjudicate) (Revised, Tentative Draft
No. 2,1981).
42. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
[voL 19: 313, 19821 Justified Party Expectations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
claim against a United Kingdom partnership for the alleged prep-
aration of misleading statements which were eventually delivered
to the plaintiff in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.43 Elaborating on the requisite foreseeabil-
ity, Friendly added that:
We believe, moreover, that attaining the rather low floor of foreseeability
necessary to support a finding of tort liability is not enough to support in
personam jurisdiction. The person sought to be charged must know, or
have good reason to know, that his conduct Will have effects in the state
seeking to assert jurisdiction over him.44
In a footnote to this passage it was stressed that in product liabil-
ity cases, sufficiently extensive activity in interstate commerce by
the manufacturer would satisfy the requirement of creating a
foreseeable risk in any one of the states served.
45
In a subsequent 10(b) case, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,46
Judge Friendly again returned to section 18. In the context of
subject-matter (legislative) jurisdiction, he read such jurisdiction
as not applying to fraud committed abroad if there was no inten-
tion that the securities should be offered to anyone in the United
States. In reaching this conclusion, Friendly cited Justice
Holmes' reference, in Strassheim v. Daily, to "acts done outside
the jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimen-
tal effects within it,"47 and distinguished Steele v. Bulova4 8 where
there was foreseeability of an effect within the United States.
4 9
As for in personam jurisdiction, Judge Friendly cited both section
18 and section 37 of the Second Restatement in support of his rul-
ing that the defendant was not amenable to suit in New York
though he knew of the fraudulent underwriting because "there is
nothing to show [he] had knowledge that some of the purchasers
would be persons residing in the United States."50
An approach which eliminates party expectations as to the ap-
plicable law from the due process calculus, and which limits the
relevance of factual expectations to the probable materialization
of the requisite jurisdictional and choice-of-law contacts, can be
easily reconciled with the recent Supreme Court jurisdictional
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
44. 468 F.2d at 1341.
45. Id. at 1341-42 n.11.
46. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911).
48. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
49. 519 F.2d at 988-89 n.35.
50. Id. at 1000.
cases. Such an approach, however, is bound to be quite critical of
the latest choice-of-law case.
THE JURISDICTIONAL CASES
While the majority opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner5' included gen-
eral language about the defendants' having "no reason to expect
to be haled before a Delaware Court,"5 2 it is quite clear that the
point being made was that the corporate fiduciaries as such "had
simply nothing to do with the State of Delaware."5 3 Their two
Delaware contacts, to wit (a) their acceptance of a directorship in
a Delaware corporation in the absence of a consent statute and
(b) their ownership of some stock in a Delaware corporation,
were insufficient contacts under due process.
In his concurring opinion Justice Stevens argued that:
[O]ne who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be
expected to know that he has thereby become subject to suit in a [re-
mote] forum. Delaware ... in effect, impose [s] a duty of inquiry on every
purchaser of securities in the national market. For unless the purchaser
ascertains both the state of incorporation... and also the idiosyncrasies
of its law, he may be assuming an unknown risk of litigation.5 4
The Stevens' concern over the unreasonableness of this duty of
inquiry for nationally traded securities is pragmatically motivated
and quite consistent with the perception of foreseeability as a
question of fact.
In his Shaffer dissent, Justice Brennan dealt with expectation
issues in greater detail, taking the position that the defendants
here are amenable to suit based on "out-of-state acts having fore-
seeable effects in the forum state."5 5 He perceived "little diffi-
culty in applying this principle to nonresident fiduciaries whose
alleged breaches of trust are said to have substantial damaging ef-
fect on the financial posture of a resident corporation."56 Conced-
ing that Greyhound Inc. was a Delaware resident only in name,
Brennan nevertheless insisted that a state's regulatory interest in
the internal affairs of locally incorporated entities supported the
state's assertion of jurisdiction.57 Even if Greyhound were to be
treated as a Delaware resident, it would not follow that the requi-
site "effect" occurred within Delaware. An effect upon a state res-
ident is not necessarily an in-state effect. Brennan is on more
solid ground when, citing Hanson v. Denkla, he referred to the
51. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
52. Id. at 216.
53. Id.
54. 433 U.S. at 218-19.
55. Id. at 226.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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"crucial fact" of the defendants' voluntary association with Dela-
ware as the "entering into a long-term and fragile[?] relationship"
with a Delaware corporation, assuming powers, undertaking re-
sponsibilities and becoming eligible for benefits under its laws.58
In Kulko v. Superior Court59 there was only one brief reference
related to expectations. The defendant New Yorker's single act of
acquiescing to the preference of his daughter to live with her
mother in California was:
[Slurely not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the
substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-sup-
port suit in a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see no basis on
which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have anticipated be-
ing 'haled before a [California] Court,' Shafer v. Heitner.
60
It is to be remembered that California had attempted to assert in
personam jurisdiction based on the "effect" of defendant's send-
ing his daughter to live in California. The quoted passage came
after the Court's determination that defendant "did not purpose-
fully derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of Cal-
ifornia" 61 and that subjecting him to suit in California was
"neither fair, just nor reasonable." 62 Thus, the reference to the ju-
risdictional expectations of the defendant appears to be nothing
more than a conclusory statement reinforcing the unfairness of
the California jurisdiction. The statement is not supported by any
factual findings of the defendant's actual state of mind and there
is no indication that any such expectations would have mattered
58. Id. at 227-28. More perplexing is Brennan's discussion of the jurisdictional
relevance of consent, where the requisite contacts and the related expectations
are closely intertwined. In Brennan's view:
If one's expectations are to carry such weight, then appellants here might
be fairly charged with the understanding that Delaware would decide to
protect its substantial interests through its own courts, for they certainly
realized that in the past the sequestration law has been employed prima-
rily as a means of securing the appearance of corporate officials in the
State's courts. Even in the absence of such a [consent] statute, however,
the close and special association between a state corporation and its man-
agers should apprise the latter that the state may seek to offer a conve-
ment forum for addressing claims of fiduciary breach of trust.
Id. at 228 n.6.
To the extent that this language is intended to address the fair notice question
and to make the point that actual consent is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, it is
consistent with the position taken in this article.
59. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
60. Id. at 98.
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 92.
even if the defendant had had the requisite contacts with
California.
In the third case, Rush v. Savchuk,63 involving the validity of
Seider-type garnishment jurisdiction under the Shaffer test, the
Supreme Court stressed that the defendant had engaged in no
purposeful activity related to the forum State of Minnesota stat-
ing, "[ilt is unlikely that [the defendant] would have expected
that by buying insurance in Indiana he had subjected himself to
suit in any State to which a potential future plaintiff might decide
to move." 64 While the emphasis here is on the well-established
rule that a plaintiff may not create jurisdiction over the defendant
by a unilateral act, such as moving to Minnesota, the jurisdic-
tional expectation language is somewhat disturbing. In terms of
result, however, it appears that this statement again merely sup-
ports a fairness decision. This decision was based on the facts re-
lating to purposeful availment or the lack thereof, regardless of
any actual, subjective expectations of the defendant.
Perhaps the most important case in this field is World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson.65 Seaway, a New York local automobile
dealer, and World-Wide, a distributor to dealers in New York,
New Jersey and Connecticut, were sued in Oklahoma, where the
accident took place, on a product liability theory. The plaintiffs
had purchased the Audi in New York. Jurisdiction was based on
Oklahoma's long-arm statute. In upholding defendant's amenabl-
ity to suit, the Oklahoma Supreme Court used an "effects" test re-
inforced by a finding that the defendants could have foreseen the
possible use of the Audi and that they did derive substantial in-
come from automobiles used in Oklahoma. This finding in turn
was predicated on the mobility of the automobile and on evidence
that some automobiles sold by defendants had in fact been used
in Oklahoma.66 The foreseeability related to a fact, to wit the pos-
sible use of the particular car in a certain state.
The Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma Court's decision on
due process grounds finding a "total absence of those affiliating
circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of
state-court jurisdiction."67 The defendants had not served the
Oklahoma market in any way: no advertising or selling efforts, no
solicitation of business in Oklahoma and no regular sales of cars
to Oklahoma customers or residents at wholesale or retail directly
63. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
64. Id. at 328-29.
65. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
66. 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
67. 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
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or through others. Jurisdiction, thus, was based solely on one iso-
lated occurrence resulting from a fortuitous circumstance.68 Be-
cause the plaintiff's argument relied heavily on this occurrence,
the Court dealt extensively with the foreseeability that a fact, that
is the injury, would occur in Oklahoma: "[F]oreseeability alone
has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction.
... [If it were so], every seller of chattels would in effect appoint
the chattel his agent for service of process." 69 Then came the key
passages:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the Forum State. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
[Kulko; Shaffer] ... The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly
administration of the laws' [International Shoe] gives a degree of predict-
ability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.
70
Those manufacturers or distributors who serve a particular
market directly or indirectly, including the delivery of products
"into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum" are amenable to suit in
that forum on a "purposeful availment" theory.71 The mere ac-
crual of "financial benefits.., from a collateral relation to the fo-
rum state will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a
constitutionally cognizable contact with that State. [Kulko ]."72
The message of World-Wide Volkswagen on the issue of party ex-
pectations is rather clear and sensible. "Effects" jurisdiction in a
state supported solely by the foreseeable possibility of the injury
occurring there, is insufficient for due process purposes. What is
needed in addition is that defendant have more significant con-
tacts and connections with the state such as purposefully serving
the local market directly or indirectly. Apparently, regular out-of-
state selling to instate customers where the cars are likely to be
used would be a sufficient contact with the instate market.73 If
68. Id.
69. Id. at 295-96.
70. Id. at 297.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 298.
73. World-Wide Volkswagen does not purport to cover all aspects of long-arm
"effects" jurisdiction relating to products liability. It would appear that an isolated
sale of a car in New York to an Oklahoma resident would not amount to regular
the requisite contacts and connections do in fact exist, then, by
way of explanation and justification, the Court refers to the rea-
sonable jurisdictional anticipations of the defendant and to his
ability, knowing the rules, to plan his transactions. Thus, the an-
ticipations do not create or support the rules but rather they are
based on them and make planning possible.
THE CONFLICTS CASE: ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. HAGUE 7 4
In the preceeding jurisdictional cases party expectations were
relied upon either in the proper factual foreseeability sense or in
a conclusory form to support a jurisdictional determination al-
ready based on other contacts. Allstate, however, not only con-
fused the distinction between expectations of fact and
expectations of law but it also used disembodied expectations,
which are expectations of events which did not materialize, as a
major independent choice-of-law factor.
Perhaps it would be useful before analyzing Allstate to review
the due process standard which supposedly prevailed in conflicts.
Professor Kirgis has formulated a detailed and accurate two-part
test. The forum may apply its law consistently with due process
only if:
(1) Any transaction, conduct or occurrence closely connected with the
claim for relief or defense on that issue [in dispute] has taken place in the
forum or the party resisting application of forum law has some
service of the Oklahoma market sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction even
where it was foreseeable and anticipated that a resale will take place in
Oklahoma. But placing the product into the stream of commerce for resale in
Oklahoma would clearly constitute regular service. See Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Klippan, 611 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1980). It is for this reason that in World-Wide
Volkswagen the manufacturer and national distributor did not object to jurisdic-
tion.
Although the issue is not free from ambiguity, it seems that it is not necessary
that the particular product causing the harm within the state must have reached
the state in a transaction involving stream of commerce foreseeability, at least so
long as similar products did so. In Le Manufacture Francalse v. District Court, 620
P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980), involving a Michelin tire sold in Germany and there incor-
porated in a Fiat automobile by the buyer, the regular service of the Colorado
market by Michelin of France was held sufficient under due process for in per-
sonam jurisdiction over Michelin. Cf. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1969).
Query whether regular selling within a state to residents of such a state but
with the expectation of frequent probable use in the adjacent states would support
jurisdiction. See the Marshall and Blackmun dissents, 444 U.S. at 313-19.
By contrast, a single sale in Oklahoma would support jurisdiction there on a
transactional basis. It is on this issue that dissenting Justice Brennan is most crit-
ical of the majority. Id. at 306-09. Under Brennan's analysis, due process is in
principle satisfied by mere predictable "effects" within the state provided that the
contacts between the plaintiff and the state generate sufficient state interests to
sustain jurisdiction. Id. at 309-13.
74. 449 U.S. at 313-20.
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nonminimal relationship with the forum that is reflected in the content or
policy of the forum's rule, and
(2) application of forum law would not be manifestly unfair to the party
resisting it. Manifest unfairness exists when the resisting party has not
done anything ... in the forum to which the specific forum rule attaches
significance... if (a) 1when a material benefit is involved] no substantial
part of the actual or anticipated benefit is desired] from sources or occur-
rences within the forum... or (b) no material benefit was expected and
the resisting party would not have reasonably foreseen that any of the
'power' conditions (as set out in paragraph (1) supra) would be met in the
forum .... 75
This formulation requires first, the actual existence of certain
minimum contacts with the state and second, certain connections
between the party subjected to the law of a state and the state it-
self. Examples of such connections include the party's conduct
within the state to which the specific rule is directed, the factual
expectations of benefits from sources or occurrences within the
forum or the factual expectation of the occurrence of the power
conditions (contacts) with the state.
In the long-awaited Supreme Court decision in Allstate, a di-
vided Supreme Court gave a clean bill of constitutionality to prob-
ably the most expansive assertion of legislative jurisdiction by a
state. In the process, the Court's majority virtually eliminated the
"transaction, conduct, or occurrence in the state" requirement,
and instead relied on nominal relationships (doing business by
defendant) which had no connection with the forum rule which
was applied. Furthermore, the Court was unanimous in treating
the unrealized expectations of the parties as a factor of major im-
portance in making fairness determinations under due process
and full faith and credit.
A brief review of the facts and issues in Allstate is needed at
this juncture. The wife of a Wisconsin decedent who had been
employed in and had commuted to Minnesota was appointed in
Minnesota as personal representative of her husband's estate.
She, thereupon, commenced suit in Minnesota against Allstate to
recover uninsured motorist benefits for the husband's death in a
Wisconsin accident not involving any of the insured cars. The de-
cedent at all times was a Wisconsin resident and so was his wife
until his death. She later moved to Minnesota. The policy had
been issued and delivered in Wisconsin and provided coverage
throughout the United States. The issue was whether "stacking"
75. Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of
Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 103-04 (1976).
of the uninsured motorist benefits, which was permitted under
Minnesota but not under Wisconsin law, was available. The pol-
icy did not expressly deal with the issue nor did it refer to an ap-
plicable law. Jurisdiction was based on Allstate's doing business
in Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court, applying a garbled
version of Leflar's theory of choice-influencing considerations, ap-
plied Minnesota law, and the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed that holding five to three. The plurality opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Brennan and the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Powell. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred separately. Mr.
Justice Stewart took no part in the decision.
Brennan made a case in favor of Minnesota law by relying prin-
cipally upon the plaintiff-related Minnesota contacts which were
the decedent's commuting employment, the plaintiff's appoint-
ment and the bonafide residence acquired after that appointment
and the administration of the estate in Minnesota.7 6 Brennan also
relied on the contacts of the litigation with Minnesota arguing, in
a most questionable manner, that the out-of-state death of a Min-
nesota employee is a Minnesota contact with the occurrence, thus
in effect transforming personal contacts into litigational ones.
77
Are solely plaintiff-related contacts sufficient for choice-of-law
or should there also be a minimum of defendant-related contacts
and fairness to the defendant? A plaintiff-oriented choice-of-law
would come conceptually close to the so called "passive personal-
ity principle" in international law, which is generally disap-
proved,7 8 and to Article 14 of the French Civil Code which
exorbitantly bases jurisdiction on plaintiff's nationality alone.
7 9
Brennan did not, however, address this question directly8 9 but in-
stead sought refuge in some defendant-related contacts including
the unrealized expectations of Allstate. Brennan, in reference to
Allstate's doing business in Minnesota argued that:
[It] can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction
76. 449 U.S. 313-17.
77. Id. at 315 n.20.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 30(2) (1965). Minnesota is apparently using a "passive personality prin-
ciple" in choice-of-law by applying its tort law in favor of its residents in situations
without any defendant-related contacts other than that it happens to do other
business in Minnesota. See Schwartz v. Consolidated Frieghtways Corp. of Dela-
ware, 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959 (1976) (compar-
ative negligence). See also Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (1978), cert. denied
444 U.S. 1070 (1980), where Minnesota applied its tort law based solely on unfore-
seeable and indirect effects in Minnesota, in violation of the requirements of the
so-called "objective territorial principle."
79. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 751-52 (2d ed.
1976) and authorities cited therein.
80. 449 U.S. 320 n.29.
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and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law to litigation in
which the company is involved. 'Particularly since the company was li-
censed to do business fin the forum], it must have known it might be
sued there, and that the [forum] courts would be bound by [forum] law"'
Clay v. Sun Ins., Black dissenting. [Brackets in the original].81
In the accompanying footnote, Brennan further stated that:
There is no element of unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expecta-
tions as a result of Minnesota's choice of its law. Because Allstate was do-
ing business in Minnesota and was undoubtedly aware that Mr. Hague
was a Minnesota employee, it had to have anticipated that Minnesota law
might apply to an accident in which Mr. Hague was involved.... Indeed,
Allstate specifically anticipated that Mr. Hague might suffer an accident
either in Minnesota or elsewhere in the United States, outside of Wiscon-
sin, since the policy it issued offered continental coverage.... At the
same time, Allstate did not seek to control construction of the contract
since the policy contained no choice-of-law clause dictating application of
Wisconsin law.
8 2
In an earlier footnote related to Allstate's presence in the state,
Brennan again dwelled on Allstate's purported choice-of-law
expectations:
Of course, Allstate could not be certain that Wisconsin law would neces-
sarily govern any accident which occurred in Wisconsin.... . Such expec-
tation would give controlling significance to the wooden lex loci delicti
doctrine. [Which is no longer controlling] .... Thus, reliance by the in-
surer that Wisconsin law would necessarily govern any accident that oc-
curred in Wisconsin, or that the law of another jurisdiction would
necessarily govern any accident that did not occur in Wisconsin, would be
unwarranted.. . If the law of a jurisdiction other than Wisconsin did gov-
ern, there was a substantial likelihood, with respect to uninsured motorist
coverage, that stacking would be allowed.. . Clearly then, Allstate could
have expected that an anti-stacking rule would govern any particular acci-
dent in which the insured might be involved and thus cannot claim unfair
surprise from the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of forum law.8 3
There are three elements in Brennan's analysis of the defend-
ant-related contacts but not one of them can survive even a cur-
sory critical review. First, Allstate's presumed familiarity with
Minnesota law does not supply the required defendant-related
contacts. A person's mere familiarity with a particular law is not
and has never been an independent or even an auxiliary due pro-
cess reason for the application of such law in the absence of the
requisite contacts or connections. Second, Allstate's knowledge
that it might be sued in Minnesota and that its courts "would be
bound by [its] laws" also constitutes insufficient contacts. Surely,
the fact that Allstate was amenable to suit in Minnesota neither
81. Id. at 317-18.
82. Id. at 318 n.24.
83. Id. at 316-17 n.22.
created an expectation nor provided a justification for the applica-
tion of Minnesota law in violation of due process. Thus, this ele-
ment begs the question of what constitutes due process. 84 The
similarity in the considerations supporting jurisdiction and
choice-of-law does not mean that jurisdiction equals forum law.
Finally, the point is made that because of the policy's continental
coverage and its silence on applicable law, Allstate could not have
justifiably expected, in the context of the modern conflict method-
ologies, that only Wisconsin law would apply to the policy either
as the lex loci contractus or as the lex loci delicti. But does the
fact that Allstate had no "vested right" in a particular law under
the prevailing conflicts system mean that any law whatsoever
could have been applied against Allstate without violating due
process? Or, more appropriately, is it necessary that choice-of-
law in itself must be based on the requisite minimum contacts? If
anything, Allstate justifiably expected that it would be subjected
only to such laws as may be applicable consistently with due pro-
cess. Using Allstate's purported expectations about the law to
support the application of such law is unpersuasive and circular.85
What is left, in addition to the plaintiff-related contacts and de-
fendant's doing business and being potentially subject to regula-
tion in Minnesota, is that the policy covered the decedent
wherever the locus of the loss, including Minnesota. Is this ex-
tended coverage a sufficient or even a significant contact to sup-
port a choice-of-law decision? Both in Watson v. Employers'
Liability Assoc. Corp. 86 and in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd.,87 the
loss covered by the policy did occur within the state whose law
was applied. Allstate stands alone in treating the geographical
84. Cf. note 19, the Brennan dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980): "One consideration that might create some unfairness
would be if the choice of forum also imposed on the defendant an unfavorable
substantive law which the defendant could justly have assumed would not apply."
If indeed the law could not justly apply then it could not be imposed on the de-
fendant whatever the forum. Accepting the pro-forum biases of the courts instead
of ignoring them or even opposing them is not only unjustified but it leads to con-
fusion on the issue of due process and on the differences between jurisdictional
and choice-of-law considerations.
85. What is puzzling here is that the circuity of the argument on legal expecta-
tions had been recognized by Brennan himself in the jurisdictional context in his
World-Wide Volkywagen dissent:
The Court suggests that this [reasonable anticipation of being haled into
court] is the critical foreseeability rather than the likelihood that the
product will go to the forum state [foreseeability of a fact]. But the rea-
soning begs the question. A defendant cannot know if this action will sub-
ject him to jurisdiction in another state until we have decided what the
law of jurisdiction is.
444 U.S. at 311 n.18.
86. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
87. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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coverage of an insurance policy, in and of itself, as a substantial
conflicts factor. The uninsured motorist coverage involved in All-
state was first-party insurance similar to casualty, medical and
life insurance and it was different from third-party liability insur-
ance.88 The insured asserts a claim based on contract against his
own insurer and the geography of coverage is clearly less signifi-
cant than in a liability claim situation. In liability insurance, the
amount of payment may well depend on the liability laws of the
state where the insured acted and/or caused injury. By contrast,
in loss (first party) insurance, it is the place of the making that
normally governs although the residence of the insured and the
principle location of the risk may be relevant in determining the
applicable law. The mere possibility that the risk may materialize
in another state, or in fact does so materialize, carries no weight
and should not suffice as a minimum contact.
89
Apparently because the uninsured motorist endorsement was
appended to an automobile liability policy and because Allstate
failed to articulate the distinction the Court misconstrued the is-
sue90 and relied heavily on the mobility of the insured automo-
88. See, e.g., 7 D.W. BLAsHmxLn, AuToMOBmE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 274.2 (3d
ed. 1966):
Uninsured motorist insurance is in the nature of a contract of indemnity.
Such insurance is not liability insurance in any sense, but it resembles
limited accident insurance; it does not undertake to protect the insured
against liability he may incur to others, as does liabiity insurance, but
rather insures him against losses occasioned to him by a limited group of
tortfeasors.
89. On insurance choice-of-law, see R. LEFLAR, AmERICAN CoNrucTs LAW 314-
16 (3d ed. 1977); CARNAnAm, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CoNTRACTS 51-
52, 264-68, 325-27 (2d ed. 1958).
In Allstate, Brennan cited Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316
(1943) in support of the proposition that the presence of an insurance company in
the state gave such a state an interest in regulating the company's obligations af-
fecting a resident plaintiff who had been appointed personal representative of an
estate. 449 U.S. 318. Powell quite properly pointed out that under Hoopeston a
state has "no interest in regulating that conduct of the insurer [which is] unre-
lated to property, persons or contracts executed within the forum State." Id. at
338.
90. The misconception of the nature of the insurance involved started in the
Minnesota Supreme Court where it was stated that,
Minnesota contacts with and interest in the facts of the present case are,
however, more extensive because the contract involved is one concerning
automobile liability insurance. In so far as the contract is one of indem-
nity for tort recovery, the kinds of contacts relevant to tort cases may be
considered.
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47 (1979). [Emphasis added].
When an insurance company doing business in a number of states writes
bile. The insured automobile had nothing to do with this
particular type of coverage because the insured was covered per-
sonally without any reference to the insured automobile. Since
the place of making and performance of the contract, the principle
location of the risk and the place of the permanent personal affili-
ations of all the parties pointed to Wisconsin, the case for the ex-
clusive application of its law should have been quite compelling
as recognized by dissenting Justice Otis of the Minnesota
Supreme Court.91 But even if the potential Minnesota effects
were to be treated as significant in the present context, given that
they did not in fact materialize, the use of the related foreseeabil-
ity and expectations was extremely dubious and the Brennan
opinion must stand or fall on the basis of the other contacts with
Minnesota.
Quite interestingly, concurring Justice Stevens considered all
the plaintiff-related contacts in Allstate as irrelevant and believed
that the plurality's reliance on them actually undermined its con-
clusion.92 Instead, in line with the jurisdictional cases, he took
the position that fairness to the defendant was the key issue.
For due process, Stevens made the expectations of the parties
the principle conflicts consideration:
The application of an otherwise acceptable rule of law may result in un-
a policy on an automobile, the company knows the automobile is a mova-
ble item which will be driven from state to state. The company, therefore,
accepts the risk that the insured may be subject to liability not only in the
state where the policy is written, but also in states other than where the
policy is written, and that in many instances those states will apply their
own law to the situation.
Id. on rehearing at 50. [Emphasis added].
As has been explained in the text, uninsured motorist coverage is not liability
insurance and is not related to injuries caused by the insured automobile.
While expressly referring to the lack of connection between the insured automo-
bile and the uninsured coverage (449 U.S. 314 n.18, 315 n.21), Brennan apparently
analyzed the case in terms of the potential relevance of the place of the accident
in a tort sense (id. at 642 n.22 discussing the lex loci delicti and interests analysis;
id. at 643 n.24).
In seeking to distinguish Allstate from John Hancock Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178 (1936), concurring Justice Stevens drew the correct distinction between
first party and liability policies:
The parties to a life insurance contract normally would not expect the
place of death to have any bearing upon the proper construction of the
policy; by way of contrast, in the case of a liability policy, the place of the
tort might well be relevant. For that reason, in a life insurance contract
relationship, it is likely that neither party would expect the law of any
State other than the place of contracting to have any relevance in possible
subsequent litigation.
Id. at 646 n.1l. But he failed to perceive the similarity between uninsured motorist
coverage and loss policies such as accident or life and assumed instead that the
issue in the case involved a tort liability policy.
91. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 50-54 (1979).
92. 449 U.S. at 331.
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fairness to the litigants if, in engaging in the activity which is the subject
of the litigation, they could not reasonably have anticipated that their ac-
tions would later be judged by this rule of law. A choice-of-law decision
that frustrates the justifiable expectations of the parties can be fundamen-
tally unfair. The desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant has been
the central concern in this Court's review of choice-of-law decisions under
the Due Process Clause.
93
The circularity and lack of substantiation which make party ex-
pectations as to law and the related concept of unfair surprise
meaningless for due process purposes has been already ex-
plained.94 But even if one were to limit the above language to fac-
tual expectations as to the relevant contacts, it is difficult to
sustain the position that Allstate's reasonable expectations were
not frustrated by application of Minnesota's law. The continental
coverage of the policy and the absence of a choice-of-law clause
could have supported Minnesota's legislative jurisdiction if the
expected loss had occurred there. The mere potentiality of its oc-
currence in Minnesota certainly should not have been sufficient. 95
Yet, this appears to be the Stevens position not only for due pro-
cess but also for full faith and credit purposes.9 6 This position is
even more questionable in the context of Justice Stevens' total re-
jection of the plaintiff-related contacts. Consequently, the sole
relevant minimum contact remaining was Allstate's presumed ex-
pectations that a contact might arise in Minnesota. The logic of
this approach would support the application against Allstate of
the law of every state within the United States.97 In the jurisdic-
tional context, its equivalent would be to sustain jurisdiction over
Seaway, the local New York dealer, in New Jersey for the
Oklahoma accident on a theory that the accident might have hap-
pened in New Jersey and Seaway had enough connections with
the New Jersey market for long-arm jurisdiction.
It is regretable that the Powell dissent in Allstate, which force-
fully disputed the adequacy of the plaintiff-related connections,
did not challenge the principal premise of the plurality's finding
of fairness to the defendant, namely the relevance of the expecta-
tions about potential contacts. Justice Powell all too readily con-
ceded that:
93. Id. at 327.
94. See text, supra notes 16-27.
95. See text, supra notes 78-82.
96. 449 U.S. at 333.
97. Cf. id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 131-32 (1980).
I would agree that no reasonable expectations of the parties were frus-
trated. The risk insured by petitioner was not geographically limited.
[Clay]. The close proximity of Hager City, Wis. to Minnesota, and the fact
that Hague commuted daily to Red Wing, Minn., for many years should
have led the insurer to realize that there was a reasonable probability that
the risk would materialize in Minnesota. Under our precedents, it is plain
that Minnesota could have applied its own law to an accident occurring
within its borders .... The fact that the accident did not, in fact occur in
Minnesota is not controlling because the expectations of the litigants
before the cause of action accrues provide the pertinent perspective.9 8
While we note with satisfaction Justice Powell's use of the factual
rather than legal concept of "expectations," there are at least
three reasons for disappointment. It appears from the quoted
passage that Justice Powell again stressed the importance of the
place of the accident not making the distinction between first-
party loss and third-party liability insurance policies. More im-
portantly, he sanctioned reliance on expectations about potential
contacts regardless of whether they in fact materialized. Finally,
in another passage on the issue of fairness, Powell refered to the
questionable factor that Allstate must have known that it might
have been sued in Minnesota 99 which confused the choice-of-law
with the jurisdictional inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Vindication of the reasonable or justified expectations of the
parties is an important goal of all private law extending to conflict
of laws and jurisdiction. The conflicts rule which recognizes the
actual consensual choice of applicable law by the parties (auton-
omy) effectuates the volition of the parties while at the same time
it strengthens the security of transactions. Comparable consider-
ations support the validation of consent and appearance as juris-
dictional grounds and the recognition of choice-of-forum clauses.
It is an entirely different matter, however, to construct a system
of hypothetical party expectations of what law should apply or
where a party should be amenable to suit. Such expectations are
not only unrelated to party volition but cannot be factually sub-
stantiated with any degree of certainty. Furthermore, the argu-
ment in their favor is circular, begging the question of what
constitutes justice and fairness in choice-of-law and jurisdiction.
Party expectations as to the facts, not as to the law, such as the
foreseeability of harmful effects occuring within a state, play a
useful, if auxiliary, role in deciding whether certain contacts and
events can be relied upon in the particular case to subject a party
to suit in and/or to the law of a certain state.
98. 449 U.S. at 336-37.
99. Id. at 333.
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In recent jurisdictional cases such as Shaffer v. Heitner, Kulko
v. Superior Court and especially World-Wide Volkswagen, the
Supreme Court attributed considerable significance to the reason-
able jurisdictional expectations of the parties. An analysis of the
reasoning of the majority opinions in these cases shows that, de-
spite some perplexing general language, the Court was referring
quite properly to factual and not to legal expectations.
The handling of party expectations in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, the long-awaited conflicts decision, is less satisfactory.
First, on the theoretical front, the line between expectations of
fact and expectations of law is even more difficult to recognize
and the ambiguity is compounded by the emphasis placed on the
absence of a choice-of-law clause. On the practical front, what is
more disturbing about Allstate is the apparent unanimity among
the eight Justices that the mere expectation that a particular law
might apply, given certain contacts, justifies its application even if
such contacts never materialize.
The Allstate result may perhaps be understandable in the con-
text of the special circumstances of the automobile insurance in-
dustry, where typically the defendants are engaged in nationwide
business and provide nationwide coverage in all respects to local
plaintiffs. In the absence of a choice-of-law clause or a special
substantive provision in the policy, it may be appropriate to sub-
ject the insurer to the law of any state which either has significant
connections with the events or is the state of the permanent affili-
ations with the insured. But beyond the automobile insurance
field, Allstate deserves a limited reading and a narrow application
of its rationale.

